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I. INTRODUCTION: OUTLINE OF TANGIBLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
The notion of a state as the guardian of its people's cultural
heritage has evolved from the mere association of objects and
monuments with a particular nation's culture1 to an international
framework that authorizes states to protect and preserve cultural
objects from theft, mutilation, and destruction.2 As people began
to recognize the inherent value of cultural objects-in that they
reflect the collective identity, development, organization, and
personality of a particular people-states proceeded to implement
national legislation to control the ownership and exportation of
cultural property originating from their territories. Ancient
monuments and sites were declared public property as were any
artifacts excavated from archaeological digs. Penal statutes were
enhanced to protect private owners from thieves. States also
reinforced customs regulations and regulated resale contracts to
prevent the removal of movable pieces from their territory.'
Although these measures stemmed certain dangers faced by
cultural property, state action alone proved inadequate in light of
the international nature of theft, exploitation, and destruction. The
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict established an international framework for
insulating cultural property from destruction or damage during
'See Halina Niec, Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1089, 1089 (1976). Identifying objects with a particular nation or people has been termed
"cultural nationalism." John H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 477, 489-93 (1988) (analyzing protection of cultural property under the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act and expounding upon idea of cultural
nationalism).
2 See generally 1 UNESCO, THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY 15-27
(1984) [hereinafter UNESCO, MOVABLE PROPERTY] (reprinting international conventions and
recommendations concerning cultural property and listing countries adopting those
measures).
3 Niec, supra note 1, at 1089 (giving extensive overview of status of national legislation
concerning physical cultural property); see also 1 LYNDEL PROrr & P.J. OKEEFE, LAW AND
THE CULTURAL HERITAGE: DISCOVERY AND EXCAVATION 31-71 (1984) (providing excellent
chronological explication of national cultural property legislation in both chronological and
regional order); M. Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 63 (1993) (synthesizing U.S. legislation protecting cultural objects).
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armed occupation.4 Peacetime restrictions on cultural property
acquisitions were subsequently imposed under the Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export,
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in an attempt to
neutralize the illicit traffic of cultural property within the collectors'
market.5  These conventions, along with other international
documents, recognize the status of cultural property as part of the
"common heritage of mankind"" and place an international duty on
states to protect not only their own cultural heritage but also all
other nations' cultural property for the ultimate benefit of man-
kind.7
The sweeping protection of these measures, however, is limited
in scope by the definition of cultural property. The terms of the
conventions include only physical forms of property by specifying
"movable or immovable property."8 Protection is not extended to
4 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, The Hague, reprinted in UNESCO, MOVABLE PROPERTY, supra note 2, app.
at 336-51 [hereinafter Hague Convention]; see also SHARON WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 34-51
(1977) (explaining Hague Convention provisions and reprinting Convention text in Appendix
I).
" The Convention on Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, Paris, reprinted in UNESCO,
MOVABLE PROPERTY, supra note 2, app. at 357-64 (hereinafter Paris Convention]; see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 178-99 (discussing Paris Convention).
' See, e.g., Preamble, Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, reprinted in UNESCO, MOVABLE PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 336 (stating
that "damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the
cultural heritage of all mankind"); see also Preamble, Recommendation for the Protection of
Movable Cultural Property, reprinted in UNESCO, MOVABLE PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 386
(stating that "movable cultural property representing the different cultures forms part of the
common heritage of mankind").
' Both the Hague and Paris Conventions outline specific obligations required of each
contracting party such as "respecting cultural property situated within their own territory
as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use
of the property and its immediate surroundings... which is likely to expose it to destruction
or damage." Hague Convention, art. 4, § 1, supra note 4. Customary international law also
imposes duties upon states to respect and protect both its own and alien cultural property.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 64-66.
' Hague Convention, ch. I, art. I, supra note 4, at 336; Paris Convention, art. I, supra note
5, at 358.
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the non-physical or intangible aspects of cultural property.9
Although many experts would concede that a motive behind
protecting the physical objects is to preserve the intangible
expression of culture in those objects,1" the convention documents
do not explicitly refer to the protection of the intangible. Thus, the
protection and preservation of intangible cultural property remains
exclusively within the discretion of individual nations.
What national and international measures currently protect
intangible cultural property and are they adequate to preserve this
form of cultural heritage? This Article will explore these questions
in an effort to determine what steps can be taken to establish more
uniform and universal intangible cultural property protection and
whether conventions (similar to those for tangible cultural proper-
ty) should be extended or developed for intangible cultural proper-
ty. This quest begins with a consideration of current national
measures and the level of protection they afford.
' To clarify the term "intangible cultural property," I draw upon the definition of "cultural
property" asserted by John Merryman: cultural property means "objects that embody the
culture." John H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339,
341 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Public Interest]. Culture has been described as the
composition of "all forms of expression, thought and action peculiar to a given community."
N'Daw, Universal Culture and National Cultures, reprinted in UNESCO, CULTURAL RIGHTS
As HUMAN RIGHTS 28 (1970). Thus, the intangible aspects of cultural property are those
elements of expression, thought, or actions embodied in the physical cultural object, and
intangible cultural property is the incorporeal characterization of that cultural expression.
10 In their treatise, Law and the Cultural Heritage, Prott and O'Keefe justify cultural
property protection by explaining that culture is significant to the development of humanity,
and the products of culture--any material manifestations of a particular society"--constitute
the cultural heritage of the society. PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 3, at 7-12. The passage
goes on to state that the "rich human experience provided by the cultural heritage is
constantly endangered. Embodied as it often is in objects which easily deteriorate.... its
loss is irremediable." Id. at 11-12. The use of the terms "material manifestation" and
"embodied in objects" suggests that the intangible cultural aspects are what is valued in the
physical property to warrant preservation. See also WHO OWNS THE PAST 3 (1. McBryde ed.,
1985) [hereinafter MCBRYDE] (stating that "[wie explore the past through our present
perceptions of the evidence for its existence in written records, oral tradition, and in the
tangible, physical remains of archaeological sites and artifacts"). See generally HISTORICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL THINGS (L. Ferguson ed., 1977).
Most recently, Roger Mastalir distinguished between the protection afforded the property
aspects of cultural property and its cultural elements. Mastalir stressed the cultural
significance of cultural property and enhancing international awareness and protection for
such elements. Roger Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the "Cultural" and 'Property"
Aspects of Cultural Property Under the International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1033
(1993).
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II. NATIONAL MEASURES PROTECTING
INTANGIBLE CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. COPYRIGHT
Although particular states have implemented domestic legislation
that specifically protects the intangible elements of property as
cultural," most nations indirectly protect intangible cultural
property through the systems of copyright, moral rights, unfair
competition, or other common-law actions. The copyright system
is based on the protection of incorporeal property.12  By legally
recognizing intellectual creations as property, a state concedes the
distinction between the physical copy of an intellectual work and
the intellectual work itself, which exists independently of its
physical manifestation,"3 and vests exclusive rights of economic
exploitation in the work's creator. 4 A state's purpose in granting
a copyright for a limited time is to allow the creator to reap
economic benefits from his or her creation."
Economic and property considerations dominate the legal
structure of copyright, yet the cultural development of the state
primarily motivates protection of intellectual creations. By
granting economic rights and protection to authors, the state
intends to stimulate the creation of new intellectual works that can
"' See, e.g., Tay, Law and the Cultural Heritage, reprinted in MCBRYDE, supra note 10,
at 3 (describing extensive laws enacted by Japan to protect as culture not only traditional
intangible products, such as music, drama, and applied art, but also Japanese manners,
customs, skills, scenic landscapes, and bridges); see also Niec, supra note 1, at 1106-08
(reprinting relevant Japanese legislation and noting use of government subsidies to maintain
national cultural heritage).12 See SAM STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 4 (1983).
13 See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968) (stating that "the
underlying rationale for common-law copyright (i.e. the recognition that a property status
should attach to the fruits of intellectual labor) is applicable regardless of whether such labor
assumes tangible form") (citing NIMMER); see also Jerome Reichman, Intellectual-Property in
International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 800-05 (1989) (providing concise explanation of notion of intellectual
creations as property).
"
4 See, e.g., The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(a) (1989) (granting exclusive
rights of reproduction, derivative works, distribution, public performance, and public display
to the copyright owner); see also STEWART, supra note 12, at 4, 58-59.
'5 See 1 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISuAL ARTS
175 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERRYMAN & ELSEN].
1994] 297
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be broadly disseminated to the public.' 6 Once the author's
economic benefits expire, the work falls into the public domain,'
7
and the state as the representative of society assumes ownership
of the creation. Thus, under a copyright system, society reaps the
benefits from readily available intellectual products while the state,
in turn, enriches its cultural heritage.'"
Copyright can also act as a protector of cultural creations. By
vesting exclusive rights in the work's creator and providing him
with an injunctive remedy for breach, copyright acts to immunize
the creation from distortion, inaccuracy and misattribution. No one
can take any protected element of expression in the artist's work
and pass it off as his own or reproduce, alter or deviate from the
work without the author's consent. Thus, the author acts as the
self-patrolling policeman of his contribution to the nation's
culture."9
16 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ("Creative
work is to be encouraged ... , but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."); see also Salah Abada, Copyright as a Factor in Cultural Development, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 16, no. 4, at 6, 12 (1982) (clarifying mutual benefit to authors-"[i]t is through the
broad dissemination of Can author's] works that he obtains the greatest moral and material
satisfaction"); Abul Hasan, Copyright and Development, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no. 112,
at 10, 11 (1982) (stating that "[p]rotection is also essential to provide incentives to creators
and their associates engaged in dissemination of the work").
17 The public domain has been characterized as the "other side of the coin of copyright."
See Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC Y 205 (1967). The
public domain consists of all those elements, such as ideas, concepts, or facts, that cannot be
protected under copyright as well as those once-copyrighted works that have lost their
statutory protection. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147, 150-53 n.20 (1981) (providing discourse and bibliography on "public domain").
is See generally STEWART, supra note 12, at 3; Abada, supra note 16, at 6-8; Hasan, supra
note 16, at 11; J. Ram6n Ob6n Le6n, Copyright as the Basis of Cultural Development,
COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no. 4, at 20, 20-21, 25 (1982); Boris Pankin, Copyright as Part and
Parcel of Cultural Policy, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no. 4, at 32, 33 (1982); Rafik Said, The
Role of Copyright in the Promotion of Development, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 11, no. 4, at 49,
51 (1977).19 See generally MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 196-213.
298
6
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/4
1994] INTANGIBLE CULTURAL PROPERTY 299
Copyright has been extended beyond state borders with the
inception of international conventions.2" Both the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention) and the Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) act
independently to establish international legal frameworks for
private copyright disputes.2' These conventions enable an author
to enforce the exclusive rights afforded nationals in the foreign
country where his work is being distributed. The conventions also
ensure that member countries provide those exclusive rights
outlined in the convention in their domestic legislation.22
B. MORAL RIGHTS
Within the system of copyright, some states also recognize an
author's moral rights regarding his creation." Although moral
0 For a thorough historical overview of the impetus behind the creation of international
copyright conventions, see STEWART, supra note 12, at 28-48 (outlining distinctions made
between international public law and international private law and providing insight into
basic principles embodied in both conventions).
2' The Berne Convention, established in 1886, stands as the oldest international
convention on copyright. For a thorough examination of its provisions, including subsequent
revisions and current membership, see STEWART, supra note 12, at 86-132; see also SAM
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987) (providing treatise overview of Berne Convention); WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION (1978)
[hereinafter WIPO GUIDE] (overview of Berne Convention).
The Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) was established to counteract the high
standards required for countries to join the Berne Convention in an attempt to facilitate a
more universal copyright system. See STEWART, supra note 12, at 134. Similar convention
coverage of the U.C.C. is provided in id. at 133-73; see also ARPAD BOGSCH, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL CONVENTION (3d rev. ed. 1968).
22 See STEWART, supra note 12, at 78-85.
2 Consult UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1990) [hereinafter
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS] for states with moral rights protection; see also RICKETsoN,
supra note 21, at 356-63 (providing state-by-state chart of Berne countries that protect moral
rights). See generally, Study of Comparative Copyright Law: Moral Rights, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 12, no. 4, at 36 (1978) [hereinafter Study: Moral Rights] (comparing UNESCO
member states positions' on moral rights).
As of 1988, England explicitly recognizes moral rights in her copyright statutes.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48 (Eng.), reprinted in 4 CURRENT LAW
STATUTES ANNOTATED 71-83 (1989) [hereinafter Copyright Act (England)]. The rights of
paternity and integrity are acknowledged, as is the converse of paternity, the offense of false
attribution, but authors must affirmatively assert the paternity right to gain enforcement.
Id.
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rights are statutorily categorized within copyright, their basis is not
one of property. Instead, moral rights subsist independently as
protectors of the creator's personality reflected in the work.2'
Unlike economic rights, moral rights are inalienable (non-transfer-
able) and, in some instances, even perpetual.25
Moral rights basically consist of the rights of publication,
paternity, and integrity.26 The right of publication allows each
creator to decide whether his work will be made public. The
paternity right ensures that the author is credited with the creation
of his published work. The right of integrity protects the work from
distortion, alteration, or misrepresentation.27 Each of these rights
acts to buffer the author's reputational interest in the work from
external abuse.
Moral rights also function as a protector of the state's cultural
interests. The accuracy and authenticity of the work is preserved
through the exercise of the author's integrity and paternity rights.
This sentiment is stated best by John Merryman in The Refrigera-
tor of Bernard Buffet when he exclaims that:
[airt is an aspect of our present culture and our
history; it helps tell us who we are and where we
came from. To revise, censor, or improve the work of
art is to falsify a piece of the culture. [The state] [is]
interested in protecting the work of art for public
reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part
U See John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023,
1025-28 (1976) [hereinafter Merryman, Bernard Buffet]; see also RICKETSON, supra note 21,
at 456-58; STEWART, supra note 12, at 58-59; WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 41 (stating that
moral rights "stem from the fact that the work is a reflection of the personality of its creator,
just as the economic rights reflect the author's need to keep body and soul together); Abada,
supra note 16, at 8 (stating that "moral rights derive their essence from the fact that the
work reflects the personality of its author").
25 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 455-58; STEWART, supra note 12, at 58, 108; WIPO
GUIDE, supra note 21, at 41-43; Abada, supra note 16, at 9; William Strauss, The Moral
Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 515-18 (1955).
See STEWART, supra note 12, at 60. Some nations, like France, also include the right
to withdraw the work from sale, the right of modification, the right to obtain royalty upon
resale, and the right to prevent excessive criticism of the work in their moral rights laws.
See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 145-47; Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note
26, at 1028; Strauss, supra note 25, at 511-14.
27 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 456-57; STEWART, supra note 12, at 59-62.
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a method of providing for private enforcement of this
public interest.'
Thus, moral rights help to ensure the sanctity of the artist's
contribution to the nation's cultural heritage.'
International conventions have extended limited moral rights
protection to cultural works. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention
recognizes the independent nature of moral rights and explicitly
grants the rights of paternity and integrity to a convention
author.30 The length of duration and method of enforcement,
however, are not mandated by the Convention; instead, the forum
where protection is sought governs these factors.3 ' This flexibility
allows non-civil law countries to limit moral rights protection to
common-law actions, such as defamation and misrepresentation.32
Moral rights do not extend to works protected by the U.C.C.
because the U.C.C. does not recognize moral rights per se.
Although some experts would argue that moral rights can be
inferred from the U.C.C. text,33 most non-Berne nations resort to
misrepresentation or other common-law means to protect minimally
the creator's reputational interest.34
sMerryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 24, at 1041.
See Carlos Mouchet, Problems of the "Domaine Public Payant," 8 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 137, 145 (1983) [hereinafter Mouchet, Problems] (arguing that governments should
protect rights of authors in interest of community benefit).
3o See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 467-76.
31 See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 43-44 (noting how countries may authorize moral
rights).
' See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 43-44; Strauss, supra note 25, at 518-520
(describing moral rights protection in Great Britain, Canada, and Switzerland). One must
note England's recent adoption of moral rights and its effect on these resources. See
Copyright Act (England), supra note 23.
33 See Adolf Dietz, Elements of Moral Right Protection in the Universal Copyright
Convention, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 21, no. 3, at 17, 21 (1987) (arguing moral rights concept
has already been incorporated into U.C.C.). See also STEWART, supra note 12, at 160 (noting
that U.C.C. does not change member countries' stand on fundamental rights of authors).
34 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(illustrating use of misrepresentation to impart moral rights protection). The United States
has joined the Berne Convention and recently passed limited, explicit moral rights protection
for visual artists only. See Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990) [hereinafter Visual Artists Act (U.S.A.)]. The United States, however, will
probably generally recognize moral rights through common-law means. See The Final Report
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARS 513, 547-57 (1986) (describing the comparability of moral rights and U.S. law);
9
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C. COMMON-LAW ACTIONS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Common-law countries characterize moral rights as reputational
and do not always include personality protection in their property-
based copyright systems. 5 Authors must rectify damage to their
reputations or the reputation of their works through the general
principles of contracts or torts. Such remedies include causes of
action for libel, defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional injury
to business relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and breach of contract.36 These common-law actions, however, do
not specifically recognize authors as a protected class;37 artists
must assert these rights as would any individual.' These rights
also are judicially determined, and thus, recovery can depend on
the existence of persuasive precedent and a favorable disposition of
the court.39
Some moral rights protection, however, has been achieved
through the application of unfair competition laws. Unfair
see also Jane Ginsberg, L'1volution ricente du droit d'auteur aux Etats-Unis, 133 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 108 (1987) (critiquing the possibility of U.S. compliance
with Berne moral rights provisions).
' See Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 24, at 1037 (noting U.S. view of works of
art as property for legal purposes); see also RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 471 (noting the
common-law view of explicit moral rights); Study: Moral Rights, supra note 23, at 36
(comparing UNESCO member states' positions on moral rights). But see supra note 23 &
accompanying text (noting England's shift towards moral rights).
36 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 157; see Strauss, supra note 25, at 519, 521
(comparing British and Canadian moral rights causes of actions with American counterparts
outside of moral rights).
37 Strauss, supra note 25, at 521.
38 Id. at 518.
' See, e.g., Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
1948), affd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949) (holding use of public domain compositions and
their composers' names without prior consent and in manner that offended composers did
not merit recovery under tort or moral rights theories); see also Abada, supra note 16, at 9
(stating that, under common law, moral rights are "subject to the judgment of the courts,
which enjoy a great deal of latitude in ruling whether or not the work has been distorted or
the author's honour or reputation harmed").
To glimpse the limited outcome that pursuit of common-law rights has achieved in the
United States, see MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 147-61; Merryman, Bernard
Buffet, supra note 26, at 1036 n.39; Strauss, supra note 25, at 518-34. See also Moral
Rights-Practical Perspectives: A Roundtable Discussion on Factual Aspects of the Moral
Rights of Integrity and Paternity, 14 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 25 (1989) (transcribing panel
discourse on industry practices and circumstances giving rise to moral rights claims by
authors under U.S. law by medium (theatre, television, textbooks, etc.)).
302
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competition laws act to shelter consumers from the mislabeling or
misrepresentation of products on the market.4 Courts have
recognized violations of unfair competition laws when an author's
work has been altered, rearranged, or misappropriated.41 These
violations have been vindicated under the guise of consumer
protection; courts have reasoned that the altered works did not
reflect the original composition and could mislead the public. 42
Protection under these acts, however, is statutorily limited to
commercial transactions ("goods and services" in commerce).'
D. PUBLIC DOMAIN
Notwithstanding that copyright, moral rights, and common-law
systems extend protection to intangible cultural property, weak-
nesses in domestic protection remain, which thwart comprehensive
intangible property protection. A copyright tolls fifty years after
the death of the author (at a maximum) and works then fall into
the public domain where use or misuse of the work is sometimes
unlimited and unrestrained." Moral rights can be extinguished
along with economic rights under some copyright systems after a
set time, or at death in common-law countries, which means that
a work's protection from mutilation or alteration does not necessari-
ly extend into the public domain.45 The negatives of common-law
actions are a lack of effective remedies. Generally, courts only
require the infringer to relabel the product and do not mandate
4 See, e.g., section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, which prohibits any "false
designation of origin," "description of fact," or "misleading representation of fact" on any
commercial "goods or services" that "is likely to cause confusion" or deceive others as to
origin, or "misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin" of a
good. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 and Supp. 1991). Section 43(a) also provides civil recovery
for "any person ... who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged." Id.
1 See Tim Jensen, The Selling of Picasso: A Look at the Artist's Rights in Protecting the
Reputation of His Name, 6 ARTS & L 77 (1981); David S. Sokolow, A New Weapon for Artists'
Rights: Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 5 ARTS & L. 32 (1980); Comment, The
Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Right and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611,620-
27 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1976).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 & Supp. 1993).
"See generally Krasilovsky, supra note 17 (making observations on public domain).
4 See RIcKETsON, supra note 21, at 473-74; Abada, supra note 16, at 9-10; Strauss, supra
note 25, at 517-18.
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discontinuation of a work's production in its non-original form or
restoration of the work to its original form.48
To combat these inefficiencies, a handful of states has extended
legislative protection to works within the public domain.47 Public
domain legislation is designed to "prevent or sanction use of public
domain works in such a way as to prejudice their authenticity or
identity."' Protection covers either works whose copyright
protection has expired or works that would have been under
copyright if such a system had existed at the time of their creation
or had extended protection to their class of works.49 In some
instances, protection extends beyond works of national origin to
include foreign works.' ° For example, Beethoven's "Fifth Sympho-
ny" was never a copyrighted work in the United States, but the
composition could be protected if the United States public domain
legislation included protection of foreign works in the public
domain because the "Fifth Symphony" would have been entitled to
copyright had such a system been in effect during Beethoven's
lifetime.
To avoid stifling any creativity or distribution, public domain
legislation strikes a balance between freedom of use and preserva-
tion of integrity. Sanctions are imposed only on those uses that
violate the work's essence, cultural value, or reputation. Thus,
modern adaptations, translations, or republications are allowed as
"See, e.g., Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26-27 (using misrepresentation tort to impart moral
rights).
"7 For a listing of countries with public domain statutes, see Study of Comparative
Copyright Law: Protection of Works in the Public Domain, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 15, no. 2,
at 30 (1981) [hereinafter Study: Public Domain]. See generally UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS,
supra note 23. Some states have not adopted all-inclusive public domain protection but
instead have passed preservation acts that protect certain classes or particularly valued
works. See, e.g., the National Film Preservation Act of 1988 and 1992, Pub. L. Nos. 100-446
and 102-307, 102 Stat. 1782 and Stat. 267 (enacted to preserve classic American films
without impeding colorization attempts).
4Working Group on Works in the Public Domain, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 13, no. 4, at 33,
34 (1979) [hereinafter Working Group]. Public domain laws primarily indict economic
exploitation but preventative measures can extend to cultural or educational violations. See,
e.g., Articles 11, 14, 19, 81, Law No. 17.336 on Copyright (Chile), reprinted in UNESCO,
COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 23.
"See Informal Consultation of Specialists on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public
Domain, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 21, no. 2, at 31, 34 (1987) (Annex I, Ch. II) [hereinafter
Informal Consultation].
o See Study: Public Domain, supra note 47, at 31.
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long as the work's character is maintained.51
Authority to control public domain usage is vested in either the
state or an agency designated by the state.52 In some instances,
prior authorization is required before a national can exploit a public
domain work. Other states preserve free use if the work's integrity
is preserved.'
One primary motive behind public domain statutes is the desire
to retain safeguards on the author's personality through the moral
rights of paternity and integrity. The state can act as the primary
assertor of these moral rights if moral rights expire with economic
rights or death, or as the secondary protector of moral rights if
moral rights are perpetual and extend to the author's heirs."
Thus, states ensure that the author's reputation with respect to his
work remains intact after his death.
A second motive for public domain legislation is the preservation
of a state's cultural heritage.65 States adopt protective laws that
will safeguard the cultural interests of the public, which implies
51 See Second Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the
Public Domain, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no. 3, at 29, 34-35 (1985) [hereinafter Second
Committee] (stating that "adaptions ... should be faithful to ... spirit, essence and
character").
" See Study: Public Domain, supra note 47, at 32-33 (listing agencies responsible for
public domain protection).
"See id. at 32 (listing those countries requiring prior authorization); see also Committee
of Non-Governmental Experts on the 'Domaine Public Payant: Analysis of the Replies to the
Survey of Existing Provisions for the Application of the System of 'Domaine Public Payant"
in National Legislation, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CEA2 12 (a), (b), at 4 (1982)
(available upon request from UNESCO) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2]
(listing prior authorization countries), and its report, Committee of Non-Governmental
Experts on 'Domain Public Payant," COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no. 3, at 50 (1982)
[hereinafter Non-Governmental Experts] (detailing results of survey by states regarding prior
authorization).
5See CARLOS MOUCHET & S. RADAELLI, II DERECHOS INTELECTUALES SOBE LAS OBRAS
LITERARIAS Y ARTIsTicAS 64-70 (1948) (characterizing "dominio publico" as the legal term for
benefit of collective and primary means towards protecting moral rights of public domain).
"See Le6n, supra note 18, at 26-27 (stating that "the State, as the depositary and
guardian of the heritage, must see to it that the original work is not distorted in any way
that would violate the deceased author's moral rights, which, intrinsically and in the
interests of sound cultural policy, are perpetual rights'); see also Theodore Limperg, Duration
of Copyright Protection, 103 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DRorr D'AUTEUR 53,87 (1980) (citing
noted copyright theorist Adolf Dietz as rejecting perpetual moral rights unless the protection
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that no confusion should exist between the original work and works
resulting from any use made of it, and prevent abusive or prejudi-
cial forms of the work from entering the public market.' Noted
public domain theorist Carlos Mouchet justifies this protection by
stating:
[o]nce a work has fallen into the public domain, it is
in the public interest that its artistic integrity should
be maintained, that the name of its creator should
not be omitted, that the title by which it can be
identified should not be removed or modified, that
the work should not be reproduced in any imperfect
or rough form, etc.
Mouchet goes on to say:
[w]hen the State introduces administrative or penal
measures with a view to the protection, safeguard
and defence of a piece of cultural property, it is...
acting ... as the representative of the interests of
the community.
57
Thus, public domain legislation acts as a cultural consumer
protection device by forestalling any intangible cultural product
that misrepresents a pre-existing work. The state's interest in the
author's contribution to its cultural heritage is preserved, and
society is not misled by cultural impostors."
No international convention exists to explicitly protect public
domain works, but commentators suggest that state-asserted
protection is possible under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.5 9
Working Group, supra note 48, at 36.
5 Mouchet, Problems, supra note 29, at 146.
"Second Committee, supra note 51, at 36.
According to Ricketson, in countries that recognize the perpetuity of moral rights,
national legislation can designate who is entitled to exercise an author's moral rights after
his death. Therefore, Ricketson notes approvingly, "the protection of moral rights post
mortem auctoris might be entrusted to a government or public agency concerned with the
promotion of national culture or to some other appropriate body." RICKETSON, supra note
21, at 474; see also WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 43-44 (suggesting that states cannot
completely extinguish an author's moral rights at death).
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However, public domain protection has been pursued by UNESCO
as part of its cultural agenda, and draft legislation has been
proposed for both national and international adoption.'
E. DOMAINE PUBLIC PAYANT
Additional requirements on the use of public domain works have
been enforced by some states under the legal rubric of domaine
public payant.61 Domaine public payant is a legislative scheme
that imposes a fee for the use62 or economic exploitation of works
in the public domain.' Funds received are funnelled into societies
that provide for the welfare of creative workers and their fami-
lies' or into state administrative agencies for the promotion of
6o See International Instrument for the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain, U.N.
Doec. CC/MD/5 (1988) (available upon request from UNESCO) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
CC/MD/5] (undertaking international legislation on public domain protection). UNESCO's
draft proposal and its merits are covered later in this Article.
" See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 356-63, for a chart of Berne countries with domaine
public payant protection; see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & PAUL E. GELLER, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (P. Geller gen. ed., 1990) (noting that France, Hungary,
Argentina, Italy, Brazil, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Germany have either proposed or at
one time had domaine public payant legislation); U.N. Doec. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CEI/2,
supra note 51 (listing domaine public payant countries including copies of their national
laws).
A limited domaine public payant system has been proposed in the United States to benefit
public arts and humanities education, but the proposal remains in committee. See Arts to
be Funded with Copyright Royalties, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, Nov. 1990, at 35.
' Domaine public payant does not apply to uses that do not constitute infringement
under copyright, or to derivative works unless the derivative work is a translation. See Non-
Governmental Experts, supra note 51, at 52.
6 See WIPO, GLOSSARY OF TERMS OF LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 86
(1980) (defining domaine public payant as requiring "the user of a work.., to pay certain
amounts in proportion to the receipts obtained from the exploitation of the work to a
competent authority"). For an in-depth consideration of domaine public payant and the
modern problems 'associated with its implementation, see CARLOS MOUCHET, EL DOMINIO
PUBLICO PAGANTE: EN MATERIA DE Uso DE OBRAS INTELECTUALES (1970), parts of which
are reprinted in Mouchet, Problems, supra note 29. Mouchet's writings provide an insightful
critique of the system, its functions, and its flaws. See also PIERRE RECHT, LE DROIT
D'AUTEUR, UNE NOUVELLE FORME DE PROPRIfTn 265-71 (1969) (discussing domaine public
payant system in detail).
"See, e.g., Albanian, Italian, Mexican, and Hungarian laws, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2, supra note 53, at Annex II; see also Adolf Dietz, A Propos de
L'Harmonisation des Legislations Nationales dans le Pays de la C.E.E., 17 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 48 (1983) [hereinafter Dietz, de L'Harmonisation]
(advocating French system for assessing domaine public payant on public domain works).
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cultural activities and exchange." The charge can (i) be perpetual
or limited in duration," (ii) vary according to category of work, 7
and (iii) apply to foreign works in a state's public domain. 6'
Failure to pay these charges can result in civil fines or penal
sanctions.60
Domaine public payant is characterized as a protector of cultural
heritage because it can provide the financial means for nations to
protect and preserve their cultural creations, particularly folk-
lore.70  In practice, however, domaine public payant mainly
functions as a promoter of intangible property by assisting authors
to generate intellectual works, which benefit both the immediate
society and its cultural heritage.7 Developing countries, in
particular, have utilized domaine public payant to facilitate
intellectual development because their populations cannot afford to
Dietz labels domaine public payant as a "community of author's royalty." Id. at 58.
" See, e.g., Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan laws, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/L/2, supra note 53, at Annex II. Some countries, like Algeria and
Brazil, also use domains public payant as a means to fund their copyright systems. Id.
"a See Non-Governmental Experts, supra note 53, at 51.
7 See U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2, supra note 53, at 5-6 (providing a royalty
percentage table by category of work).
68 See, e.g., Decree/Law No. 1224/58 (1958) (Argentina), NIMMER & GELLER, supra note
61, at § 3[d].
" See, e.g., U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CEI/I2, supra note 53, at 7-8 (listing fines
imposed by countries).
" See, e.g., Copyright Ordinance No. 73-14 of 3 April 1973 and No. 73-46 of 25 July 1973,
art. 4(8) (Algeria), reprinted in U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2, supra note 53, at
Annex II (stating that fees are charged to "ensure the protection of works constituting the
traditional cultural heritage and the folklore... and the works of nationals which are in the
public domain").
71 See ADOLF DIET, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 163-64 (1978)
[hereinafter DIEmr, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY]. Opponents ofdomainepublicpayant argue that
domains public payant thwarts rather than aids the dissemination of public domain works.
This argument is readily refuted when one looks at the goal of copyright-broad public
dissemination-in light of market practice. Free use of public domain works does not benefit
cultural property consumers; instead, disseminators of cultural works capitalize on free use.
The price charged consumers under copyright remains the same or even increases after the
work's copyright expires. The price does not drop to reflect the publisher's loss in fixed cost
royalties; it remains constant and publishers reap the profits. See Limpberg, supra note 55,
at 81 (citing Corbet); Mouchet, Problems, supra note 29, at 139-40; Committee of Governmen-
tal Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain: Observations Received from
Member States Concerning the Report of the Working Group on Works in the Pubic Domain,
U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG//4 (1982) (available upon request from UNESCO) [hereinafter
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support artists under a patronage system.72
No existing international conventions impose domaine public
payant,73 although amendments to include domaine public payant
protection have been suggested by UNESCO to both the U.C.C. and
Berne Conventions.74 International draft documents, like the
Tunis Model Law on Copyright, have encouraged the implementa-
tion of domaine public payant to help developing countries fund
copyright systems, stimulate creative activities, and preserve their
rich cultural heritages.75 One scholarly commentator has even
offered domaine public payant as a solution for the copyright
duration problems facing the European Economic Community as it
consolidates.76
In some ways, the system of domaine public payant effectuates
a transfer of the author's economic rights at expiration of copyright
to the state or to a delegated artists' association. The delegee's
assumption of the author's rights, however, is non-exclusive;
anyone has the right to use a public domain work subject to
payment of the fee.77 But when domaine public payant is coupled
with a public domain system, the full protection of copyright is
imitated for cultural works in the public domain.
III. FOLKLORE AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF CURRENT PROTECTION
The five state measures outlined above (copyright, moral rights,
unfair competition, public domain, and domaine public payant)
represent all existing forms of legal protection for intangible
property. Their topical order graphs the level of coverage each
system provides from the least available (copyright) to the greatest
possible (public domain plus domaine public payant). The majority
7" See Non-Governmental Experts, supra note 51, at 49.
73 See RICKEMSON, supra note 21, at 355 (citing Berne Convention).
14 See U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CEI/2, supra note 53, at 1 (stating that committee
of experts was convened specifically to prepare guidelines for public domain protection for
U.C.C. and Berne Convention).
71 See Tunis Model Law on Copyright and Commentary, § 17, reprinted in COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 10, no. 2, at 10, 29 (1976) [hereinafter Tunis Model Law] (stating that purpose
of domaine public payant is to "protect and disseminate national folklore").
76 DIETZ, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 71, at 160-64; Dietz, de L'Harmonisation,
supra note 64.
7 See DIETz, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 71, at 163-64.
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of states, however, tends to congregate at the lower end of the
scale. Most countries offer little protection beyond mere copyright
or copyright coupled with unfair competition and/or moral rights
that terminate at death.78 Since convention protection usually
depends on the domestic legislation in force, preservation of
intangible cultural property on an international scale is limited to
those works that can obtain shelter in countries granting perpetual
moral rights or public domain protection.7" To illustrate the
difficulties intangible cultural property faces when it seeks redress
by national or international means, the legal protection of folklore
will be examined.
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON FOLKLORE
The term "folklore" literally means "wisdom of the people,"' but
obtaining a more explanatory definition is difficult due to folklore's
amorphous and inclusive nature.8 " A general understanding can
be gleaned from reading folklorist Kanwal Puri's explication:
Folklore is a living phenomenon which evolves over
time. It is a basic element of our culture which
reflects the human spirit. Folklore is thus a window
to a community's cultural and social identity, its
standards and values. Folklore is usually transmit-
ted orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms
include language, literature, music, dance, games,
mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts and other
78 Roughly seventy percent of Berne members do not extend intangible property
protection beyond the expiration of copyright. See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 356-63
(chart). Although England and the United States have recently adopted moral rights, these
countries only increase that percentage. See STEWART, supra note 12, at 78-85 (noting that
some states recognize moral rights); supra note 23 (noting England's adoption of moral
rights); supra note 34 (noting United States' adoption of moral rights).
7 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 356-63 (chart).
so Edward Petrovich Gavrilov, The Legal Protection of Works of Folklore, 20 COPYRIGHT
76 (1984); see also Marie Niedzielska, The Intellectual Property Aspects of Folklore Protection,
16 COPYRIGHT 339 (1980) (describing folklore as the "knowledge of the people").
" See Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Folklore, UNESCO HQ,
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arts. Folklore comprises a great many manifesta-
tions which are both extremely various and constant-
ly evolving. Because it is group-oriented and tradi-
tion-based, it is sometimes described as traditional
and popular folk culture.8 2
This passage touches upon folklore's basic traits: namely, that (i)
it is passed from generation to generation by unfixed forms; (ii) it
is a community-oriented creation in that its expression is dictated
by local standards and traditions; (iii) its creations generally are
not attributable to individual authors; and (iv) it is being continual-
ly utilized and developed by the society in which it lives.'
Folklore perpetually identifies a nation's cultural history and is
considered a fundamental element of a nation's cultural patrimo-
ny. 8
Because of its evolutionary and unfixed form, external sources
subject folklore to substantial threats. Folklore, especially within
developing countries, is being consumed by mass communication
and importation of foreign cultural works. The risk of total
dissolution of folkloric culture is prevalent if preservation actions
are not taken." Economic exploitation of folkloric works has also
2 Kanwal Puri, Copyright Protection of Folklore: A New Zealand Perspective, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 22, no. 3, at 18, 19 (1988).
83 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 313; Gavrilov, supra note 80, at 79; Le6n, supra note
18, at 27; Claude Masouy6, La Protection des Expressions du Folklore, 115 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DRorr D'AUTEUR 2, 2-4 (1983); Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 340, 344;
Puri, supra note 82, at 19; see also Regional Committee of Experts on Means of Implementa-
tion in the Arab States of Model Provisions on Intellectual Property Aspects of Protection of
Expressions of Folklore, Doha, Qatur, 8-10 Oct. 1984, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no. 2, at 15,
16 (1985) [hereinafter Regional Committee of Arab States] (stating that "folklore which is a
heritage handed down from generation to generation is an indication of the people's spirit
and wisdom and their link with the roots of their civilization").
" See Experts on Folklore, supra note 81, at 28; see also Masouy6, supra note 83, at 4
(noting folklore's importance to state's cultural heritage); Resolutions Concerning UNESCO's
Activities in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring Rights for 1990-1991 Adopted by the
General Conference of UNESCO at its Twenty-Fifth Session, COPYRIGHT BULL, vol. 24, no.
1, at 7, 9 (1990).
' See Experts on Folklore, supra note 81, at 38; see also THE CHALLENGE TO OUR
CULTURAL HERITAGE 21 (Yudhihthir Raj Isar ed., 1986) [hereinafter ISAR] (noting developing
countries' loss of identity with acceptance of outside cultural models); UNESCO, CULTURAL
POLICY: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 38 (1969) (stating that "[t]he preservation of the cultural
heritage... is commonly regarded as within the scope of cultural affairs ... [and] is now
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been usurped by outside forces to the point that, even within a
nation's own territory, nationals pay foreign publishers for
reproductions of their own cultural works. Those publishers reap
a substantial profit without providing any compensation to the
nation's culture as creator." Folkloric works also are victims of
integrity violations in that they suffer mutilation, distortion, and
misappropriation, particularly when recreated outside their natural
habitat or without authorization. 7 For example, an American
production company could capture an African tribal ritual on film
or tape and, upon return to America, incorporate the recording into
a television documentary, movie, radio program, or advertisement
without any obligation to remunerate the African performers for
exploiting the ritual and without any obligation to accurately
attribute the ritual to its creating tribe.
B. COPYRIGHT APPROACH TO PROTECTING FOLKLORE
To combat these threats, nations have sought to incorporate
folklore into their current methods of protecting intellectual
creations, but with limited success. States logically turn first to
copyright law since it governs the industry of expressive works and
looked upon as the means of defence against an anonymous technological civilization and of
safeguarding traditional folk values"); Alan Jabbour, Folklore Protection and National
Patrimony: Developments and Dilemmas in the Legal Protection of Folklore, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 17, no. 1, at 10, 11 (1983) (noting that folklore "replication constitutes not only
an economic but a cultural and psychological threat to the authentic practitioners of
traditional arts and to the traditional group whose values those arts express'); Le6n, supra
note 18, at 30 (clarifying dangers of cultural encroachment that developing countries face
under current systems-" '[i]mported culture' cannot serve as a panacea for the immense
requirements of cultural development, since if unaccompanied by a genuine policy of
promotion of national cultural identity it will merely result in a country being invaded by
ideas, concepts, philosophies and lifestyles which alienate and thwart the growth of its
individuality by forcing on it patterns that are out of harmony with its own development
needs").
" See Gavrilov, supra note 80, at 76; see also Jabbour, supra note 85, at 12 (acknowledg-
ing that denial of compensation for local creations is one impetus behind pursuit of folklore
protection).
87See Committee of Expert on the Legal Protection of Folklore, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 11,
no. 3, at 28, 29-33 (1977) [hereinafter Legal Protection of Folklore]; Masouy6, supra note 83,
at 4-6; Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 345; Puri, supra note 82, at 20.
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folklore qualifies as a product of human creation.' Copyright
offers an immediate structure (both national and international),
extensive protection, and economic opportunity since states need
only to develop or amend their copyright laws to include provisions
for folklore protection.89
The Tunis Model Law was designed specifically to aid developing
countries in drafting copyright legislation that would comply with
international conventions."° Section 6 explicitly grants economic
exploitation rights and the moral right of paternity to "works of
national folklore" for a perpetual duration. Under Section 18, these
rights are vested in a competent authority delegated by the state
to represent either the individual author or the community
responsible for the folkloric creation. Even a denial of importation
or exportation of unauthorized works is entailed.9' One must note
that, notwithstanding the ample legal protection for folklore, the
Tunis Model Law is only suggested legislation for developing
countries, and those countries are free to excise folklore protection
from the model law or to not enforce those provisions. One
commentator confirms that the latter is reality.92
If a state's national copyright legislation includes folklore, then
the state can seek international copyright protection under the
Berne Convention. Article 15(4) recognizes folklore as a special
category of anonymous works so that members can economically
exploit their own cultural heritages.93 In pertinent part, Article
15(4) states:
" See Masouyd, supra note 83, at 6 (noting attempts at Stockholm revision of Berne
Convention to insert provisions for protection of folklore through copyright).
See, e.g., Tunis Model Law, supra note 75.
"See Preliminary Draft of a Model Law on Copyright for Developing Countries in Africa,
COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 7, no. 2/3, at 6, 7 (1973) (intending provisions to be compatible with
Berne Convention and Universal Copyright Convention).
"Tunis Model Law, supra note 75, at 17, 29.
See Gavrilov, supra note 80, at 77.
See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 95-96. The inclusion of folklore was not motivated
by a desire to protect folklore per se; the provisions were designed to encourage culturally
rich developing countries to become Berne members so that the developed countries that
export a high percentage of their intellectual creations to these nations would gain copyright
protection for their works. See RAYMOND MADDISON, COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 52 (1983).
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In the case of unpublished works where the identity
of the author is unknown, but where there is every
ground to presume that he is a national of a country
of the Union, it shall be a matter for legislation in
that country to designate the competent authority
which shall represent the author and shall be enti-
tled to protect and enforce his rights in the countries
of the Union.94
Countries that modify their copyright legislation to include
anonymous authorship must first notify the World Intellectual
Property Organization [WIPO] before the designated authority's
claims will be recognized.95
The extensive protection offered by Article 15(4), however, is
misleading when one considers the impracticability of folklore ever
satisfying the Article's requirements. A folkloric creation must first
meet the stated prerequisites, i.e., the work must be unpublished,
its author must be unknown, and that author must presumptively
be a national of a member nation. Partial satisfaction is plausible
because folklore, by its nature, is anonymous and any nationality
presumptions can be overcome by the author's attribution to a
given community." For example, the legend of Johnny Appleseed
cannot be attributed to a particular person, but it is undoubtedly
an American folktale. However, it is questionable if such author-
ship extends to the works of folklore that are fathered by the
community rather than by an anonymous individual. Because most
folkloric works are community-created, this non-personage elimi-
nates protection outright.97 Even so, publication triggers the
release of a work from state control; the designated agency loses its
authority to represent the anonymous author. Since the majority
of folkloric works are already published, there is little or no room
for state assertion of Article 15(4) protection.98
RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 929.
"See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 95.
9See Masouy6, supra note 83, at 6-8 (denoting amorphous characteristics of folklore).
9 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 313. But see Tunis Model Law, supra note 75
(asserting compatibility with Berne rules and yet recognizing ethnic communities as
authors).
9See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 315 (text of Article 15(4).).
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Nations also must enact domestic statutes that both recognize
folklore as protected subject matter and authorize a competent
authority to enforce the convention's vested rights. Qualification
alone does not remedy copyright infringement since redress is
dependent on notification. 9 The fact that only six Berne members
provide the legal foundation necessary to assert these rights"°
and only one country has notified WIPO (as of 1988)01 com-
pounds the futility of labeling Article 15(4) as protective. Even if
a folkloric work manages to jump through all of these hoops,
protection is still meager since Article 7(3) limits duration to fifty
years from the date of lawful publication. 2
Obtaining any shelter under the Convention's general provisions
also appears chimerical. Those countries that do protect folklore
can seek relief only in countries that recognize folklore as protect-
able subject matter since folklore does not fall within the mandato-
ry enumerations of Article 2.103 With fewer than ten countries in
this realm, most of which are developing countries,' °4 the plausi-
bility of folklore obtaining any relief from international exploitation
is nil.'0 5 Berne Convention commentator Sam Ricketson also
notes that a state's other folklore concerns, such as the sanctity of
religion or custom, are beyond the limited scope of the Convention
and thus, any domestic laws that protect these interests cannot
utilize the Convention's text as a catalyst for aid."°
In general, the legal structure of copyright is ill-suited for
"See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 95.
100 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 356-63 (chart).
10 See Puri, supra note 82, at 22 n.17.
102 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 315, 340. Article 7(3) extends protection to life plus
fifty years if the author reveals his identity, but considering that most folkloric works cannot
be attributed to any author (lost in time) or only traceable to a community which has an
immeasurable life span, such an event is highly unlikely.
103 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 306-07 (discussing national treatment).
104 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 356-63 (chart); see also Niedzielska, supra note 80,
at 342 (stating that European countries protect folklore as compilations, which suggests that
number of Berne members protecting folklore could be as high as ten).
'a' The Berne Convention does provide developing countries with special treatment for
educational use, compulsory translations, and reproduction licenses, but these concessions
tend to favor protecting imported developed countries' works and not external exploitation
of developing countries' creations. See MADDISON, supra note 93, at 54-55; RICKETSON, supra
note 21, at 607-21.
'06 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 313, 315.
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adequately protecting folklore. Copyright laws recognize solely an
individual author's creative expression as the authorship in a work
and normally require fixation 7 of the work in a tangible medium
before limited duration rights will vest. Copyright entitlement does
not retroactively extend to those works in existence prior to the
enactment of copyright laws."8 Since folklore violates these
generally established conditions, it is condemned to wallow in the
unprotected marshes of the public domain unless special provisions
are created to excuse its unqualifying nature."° One should note
the limited number of countries that have issued such a par-
don.11
0
C. MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION AND UNFAIR COMPETITION MEANS
Moral rights protection also depends on the recognition of folklore
as a protected class."' In countries that both extend moral rights
in perpetuity and designate an authority to enforce those rights for
folkloric works, folklore can secure relief from paternity and
integrity violations.11 2 In most states, however, moral rights are
codified within copyright law and satisfaction of copyright prerequi-
sites precedes any grant of moral rights. Thus, folklore is once
again excluded unless exceptions are secured.
Remedying folklore's misattribution and mutilation in commercial
107 Denial of the fixation requirement allows Berne members to exempt folklore from this
general copyright requirement, see RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 242-43, but most nations
mandate fixation to qualify for domestic protection. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1993) (U.S.A.).108 See RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 313; Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 344; Puri, supra
note 82, at 23-34.
1
" See Jabbour, supra note 85, at 13; Puri, supra note 82, at 24; see also Robin A.I. Bell,
Protection of Folklore: the Australian Experience, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no. 2, at 4 (1985)
(looking at Australia's dilemma when it attempted to protect folklore under copyright).
110 See supra note 104. Masouy6 notes the possibility of protecting folklore under
neighboring rights and sui generis means, but dismisses these rights as ineffective to protect
against exploitation. Masouyd, supra note 83, at 10-11 (discussing sui generis protection);
see also Puri, supra note 82, at 22.
1 See Puri, supra note 82, at 21-22. Moral rights protection within the common-law
countries, however, cannot exist as long as reputational actions are the only remedy.
11' In addition, Gavrilov suggests that the group representation recognized under
copyright for authors' societies would be suitable for folkloric work protection. Gavrilov,
supra note 80, at 78-79.
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products can be pursued under the laws of unfair competition. 113
By forbidding reproduction on the grounds of consumer confusion
and misidentification, community cultural creations can be
protected from external exploitation. States generally authorize
particular groups to monitor and control commercial exploita-
tion."4  To gain protection, however, folklore must qualify as a
commercial good or service. Some aspects of folklore, such as
rituals or dance, function only in the realm of society and do not
generally qualify as commercial activities.
D. PUBLIC DOMAIN AND DOMAINE PUBLIC PAYANT PROTECTION
Public domain legislation is the most prevalent method states
choose to protect and exploit their folkloric creations. States can
readily classify folklore as a segment of their public domain . .5
and thus can control folklore's usage. Consideration is given to
modern artists who create new, copyrightable works based on
folklore and societal usage so that the cultural evolution is not
retarded."' Public domain systems also facilitate the application
of domaine public payant to works of folklore.
Economic exploitation has been achieved through the imposition
of domaine public payant for commercial usage. By imposing a
royalty on such usage, states generate funds that are diverted
towards meeting the community's cultural needs." 7 The Tunis
113 See Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 345-46 (citing Poland's unfair competition laws'
appellation of origin provisions); Puri, supra note 82, at 22 (noting conditions governing
commercial use of folklore).
114 See id. (noting French unfair competition laws and Art. 4 of Poland's 1926 Law of
Unfair Competition).
See Puri, supra note 82, at 24; see also RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 315 (noting
Article 15(4) does not extend to public domain folklore). But see Le6n, supra note 18, at 27-
28 (criticizing folklore's classification as public domain material); Niedzielska, supra note 80,
at 343-44 (stating, ][iln view of the fact that these works have never been protected by
copyright, there would be no justification for treating them now as an escheated heritage").
"' See, e.g., U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2, supra note 53, at Annex II (Albania);
see also Legal Protection of Folklore, supra note 87, at 32; Le5n, supra note 18, at 28;
Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 340, 343, 346 (concluding "the measures for its protection
should not create barriers that would hamper the popularization of folklore or cancel out the
benefits of copyright in works based on folklore").
17 See, e.g., Yugoslavia Law of 20 July 1968, art. 52, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CEI/2, supra note 53, at Annex II; see also Puri, supra note 82, at 22.
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Model Law even advocates the implementation of domaine public
payant for developing countries to "protect and disseminate
national folklore.""' Although experts question the ability of
domaine public payant alone to protect folklore from abuse,119 the
system can sustain artists in developing countries and can help to
both preserve oral folklore in archives and educate people about
their folkloric heritage.12
The main drawback to relying on the public domain and domaine
public payant is the lack of an international structure to enforce
these protective measures extraterritorially. Because the bulk of
abuse arises outside the borders of the country of origin, effective
protection of a state's folkloric heritage is sometimes unachievable.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR MORE ADEQUATE AND
UNIVERSAL PROTECTION
A. ESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
The above discussion on folklore illustrates the need for stronger
protection of mankind's intangible cultural heritage. What steps
can be taken to ensure adequate and universal protection for
intangible cultural property? First, establishing the basic moral
rights of paternity and integrity on an explicit, impartial, and
mandatory basis would ensure that current creations of intangible
cultural property are adequately protected. Once an artist
transfers his economic rights, he loses control over his work unless
inalienable moral rights are granted to him. Even so, moral rights
protection under the Berne Convention is limited to domestic
provisions in countries where "protection is claimed."' 2' If moral
rights infringement transpires in a non-explicit or limited moral
See Tunis Model Law, supra note 75, at 29 (§ 17(2Xb)).
1
,See Jabbour, supra note 85, at 14; Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 344; Puri, supra note
82, at 27 n.29.
' See, e.g., U.N. Doc. UNESCO/WIPO/DPP/CE/I/2, supra note 53, at Annex II (Senegal);
see also Le6n, supra note 18, at 28 ("[Wjhen the royalties are paid to the community that is
the owner of the work of folklore, they act as an incentive to preserve and communicate the
values enshrined in the work, and at the same time they are of economic benefit to the
community concerned. Both of these are praiseworthy results and in line with policies aimed
at satisfying the immense needs of developing countries").
121 WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 43 (Art. 6bis(2)).
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rights nation, the injured author must settle for reputational
remedies, which may not rectify the damage done to the work itself.
Thus, mandatory moral rights protection is necessary if cultural
contributions are to maintain their original form and integrity.
Although moral rights have been characterized as reputational
in nature, a state's justification for granting explicit moral rights
must extend beyond the author's own reputational needs. The
rights of paternity and integrity denote a collective cultural interest
in preserving the work itself; otherwise, why would a state enact
provisions specifically protecting integrity when artists have
defamation weapons at their disposal? The public has a legitimate
interest in ensuring that its cultural works are preserved as their
creators intended so that their inherent cultural value will not be
lost or distorted. 122 Some states recognize this interest by direct-
ly creating a public cause of action for integrity violations.'
23
This public interest justification also cohesively links moral
rights with a state's rationalization for copyright. If the goal of
copyright is the creation of works for society, it is counterproductive
for works to be inaccurately disseminated, particularly if cultural
works tell members of a society who they are. For example, if a
contemporary Shakespeare transferred the copyrights to his play,
"A Midsummer Night's Dream," 124 and the new owner deleted
Acts 1, 2, and 3 before releasing the play to theatres, Shakespeare
would have no direct legal remedy for the distortion of his original
work. Moral rights prevent this distortion by requiring accuracy in
the reproduction of an original work.
"
2 Merryman describes this interest as a social abhorrence for cultural counterfeiters who
distort cultural identity by inaccurately recreating works. Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra
note 24, at 1041; Public Interest, supra note 9, at 359-60.
123 See, e.g., Cultural and Artists Creations Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 989, (West
Supp. 1994) (stating that "there is a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations"), reprinted in MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 165. See also
Edward J. Damich, State 'Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 CoLuM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 291, 293 n.8, 339 (1989) (listing state moral rights laws and classifying these
statutes according to level and extent of protection). Damich's article considers these state
statutes in light of the Berne Convention's moral rights requirements and concludes that
these laws provide insufficient protection to comply with the Berne convention. Id. at 299,
338. Damich also considers the possible preemption of these statutes due to the United
States becoming a Berne signatory. Id. at 329-38.
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Integration of paternity and integrity rights can ensure proper
attribution of origin and prohibit modifications that can alter a
work's valued expression. A work is best served by vesting these
moral rights in the work's creator, much like the copyright infringe-
ment delegation, because the creator is more knowledgeable of the
work's usage and personality (which is his own) than the policing
arm of the state.
To be effective, these entitlements must be inalienable or non-
transferable; otherwise, the author's protection could be divested
with the transfer of the work's economic rights. Moral rights must
parallel economic rights in duration and must be granted to all
artistic works that qualify for copyright protection; otherwise, value
judgements will too narrowly determine the kinds of cultural
contributions that ought to be protected. 125 The remedies granted
can vary among the different subject matters, but moral rights
must be non-discriminatory for protection to be universal.
126
States, however, cannot afford to allow authors the unfettered
exercise of moral rights if intellectual property industries are to
flourish. The ability to waive contractually some alterations of a
work is necessary for the publication, distribution and transfer of
mediums to be manageable.1 27 Even France, which grants exten-
sive and inalienable moral rights, has judicially recognized the need
to sustain consensual changes.128 States also must acknowledge
that violations of moral rights must be objectively determined in
light of the artist's personality and of the particular medium of
expression chosen. As scholars attest, moral rights cannot be
applied rigidly in all instances due to the variation in use of
copyrightable works. For example, works that are intended to be
12 Statutes that extend moral rights only to selected subject matters discriminate against
works that have immeasurable cultural impact. Recent U.S. legislation, for example, denies
protection for motion pictures, broadcasting, or newspapers, yet these mediums are the
predominant means by which Americans receive input about their culture. See Visual
Artists' Rights Act (U.S.A.), supra note 34 (section 602 defining "work of visual art").
" For example, a court would not necessarily grant the same relief for the alteration of
a Picasso painting that it would for changes to a compilation, but the latter merits at least
minimal moral rights redress as a cultural contribution to society.
'2 See, e.g., Copyright Act (England) ch. 4, § 87, supra note 23, at 81 (codifying
consensual waiver of moral rights); see also Damich, supra note 123, at 325-29 (considering
alienability and waiver of moral rights from American perspective).12 See Strauss, supra note 25, at 515-16, 537.
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performed, by their nature, are subject to individual nuances.
Consumers of those works must not be inhibited from using the
work freely; otherwise, such copyrightable works can never be
performed without violating the creator's moral rights." Best
stated, "the goal of moral rights protection should be to protect as
completely as possible the personality of the artist embodied in the
work without seriously impairing the competing rights.' 30
Once states adopt domestic moral rights legislation, more
universal international protection will automatically result. The
national treatment guarantees and international minimum
standards of the U.C.C. would ensure protection for U.C.C. works.
The increase in the number of protecting forums would strengthen
the punch of Berne's Article 6bis. Mandatory recognition of
paternity and integrity as moral rights in both conventions would
best achieve the universal protection that intangible cultural
products need.
B. ADOPTION OF PUBLIC DOMAIN LEGISLATION
The second step towards adequate protection is providing
continuous integrity for works that lie outside copyright through
the medium of public domain laws. By extending moral rights into
perpetuity, states can ensure that the "cultural and human value
of works in the public domain" is preserved for future generations.
Mark Twain's novel, "The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,"'3' for
example, which reflects life on the Mississippi River during the
19th century, could be protected from editorial enhancement or
deletion. After all, "the moral value of a work [does] not change
after its author's death." 32 Mouchet classifies this elongation of
protection as a state obligation, because perpetual moral rights are
"based on the need to defend the cultural heritage of the collectiv-
ity. This is a matter of protecting and defending a literary or
artistic work as cultural-not merely economic-property." 33
Perpetual moral rights can vest in either (i) the descendants of
" See Merryman, Bernard Buffet, supra note 24, at 1043-47.
'3 Damich, supra note 123, at 302.
131 MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER (1936).
132 Second Committee, supra note 51, at 31.
133 Mouchet, Problems, supra note 29, at 145-146.
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the work's creator as legitimate heirs to his estate or (ii) the state
as heir to the creations of its nationals. Although the author's
direct descendants might have closer personal interests in preserv-
ing the author's work, uncertainty can arise as the lineage becomes
more distant from the author and subdivided among several
families. Delegation to a state department, on the other hand, can
provide the system with consistency and certainty.
One major criticism of state control over a public domain work's
integrity is the potential for censorship by the state, i.e., the state
can control current creations by controlling access to their public
domain inspiration. To avoid censorship possibilities, a state would
need to implement guidelines as to what preserving the integrity
of a work entails. A forum should be provided for consultation of
public domain use issues. Experts suggest that designation of a
publicly accessible, national depository, like the National Library
of Congress, can act as a reference for satisfying the use guidelines
and as a resource for accuracy in dissemination."3 One should
note that these laws must balance preservation interests and public
usage interests so that cultural development will continue to
progress.
International perpetual moral rights legislation can be achieved
under Article 6bis(2) of the Berne Convention."' The strength of
Article 6bis moral rights protection, however, is limited to those
countries that perpetuate moral rights in their domestic legislation
and that allow entities other than the work's creator to assert
moral rights.136
Amendments of Article 6bis to require mandatory public domain
legislation were proposed during the Brussels Revision of the Berne
Convention in 1948, but were tabled because of resistance by
common-law countries. The proposal read as follows:
The countries of the Union undertake to accord the
13 See Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public
Domain, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 17, no. 3, at 25, 29 (1983) [hereinafter Experts on Public
Domain].
1
" See WIPO GUIDE, supra note 21, at 43 (stating that moral rights "shall be exercisable
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right of respect to works fallen into the public
domain, and particularly to important works general-
ly admired, irrespective of the time period to which
they belong or their country of origin. Literary,
theatrical, musical, plastic, cinematographic or other
adaptations of the said works are only permitted on
condition that they do not travesty or falsify them in
their spirit by distortions, mutilations, changes, cuts
or additions capable of falsifying them and seriously
injuring the beauty of the work and consequently the
moral right of the author and his reputation. Paro-
dies which are presented as such without causing
possible confusion with the original work are none-
theless authorized. 3 7
Adequate international protection could be achieved for post-
copyright works if this proposal were reintroduced and adopted.
The most forward-looking efforts at international public domain
coverage are embodied in UNESCO's Draft Recommendation to
Member States on the Safeguarding of Works in the Pubic Do-
main.138 These proposals reflect ten years of research into public
domain issues and are derived from two separate committees of
governmental experts, corresponding state responses to those
committees' recommendations, and selected reports that reflect the
viewpoints of particular interest groups.13' Although these
1S7 Reprinted in RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 463-64.
' Draft Recommendation to Member States on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public
Domain: Item 7.5 of the Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. 25 C/32 (1989) (available upon
request from UNESCO) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 25 C/32]; see also Working Group, supra note
48, at 33-34 (noting UNESCO's ambition "to guarantee the authenticity of works of the mind
in the face of the dangers of distortion, disfiguration and deformation of said works which
result from popularization and commercial exploitation which [had] become more and more
marked, especially in the case of works that have fallen into the public domain").
'L See, e.g., Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the
Public Domain: Quest for Ways and Means of Preventing the Distortion of Works in the
Public Domain, and Study of the Possibility of Formulating Draft Recommendations
Applicable at the National and International Levels to Serve as the Basis for the Preliminary
Study on Technical and Legal Aspects, Which is Due to be Submitted to the Executive Board
of Unesco at its 116th Session, U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/l/10 (1982) (available upon
request from UNESCO) (providing cohesive digesting of selective reports and state
responses); U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/Il/4, supra note 53 (outlining particular state
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recommendations are being revised with a view to stipulating an
appropriate treaty, the General Conference publication encourages
UNESCO members to implement domestic laws that will comply
with the draft text. This text recommends that (i) prior authoriza-
tion be eliminated, (ii) performance needs be met, and (iii) freedom
of use be preserved through the allowance of parody and transla-
tions. Paternity and integrity rights are specifically enumerated,
and special concessions have been given to some countries in that
the text recognizes alternative means to public domain protection,
such as perpetual moral rights and unfair competition or consumer
protection. Violations are to be sanctioned domestically with the
imposition of domaine public payant remaining optional. Lastly,
international cooperation is advocated but only at the instigation
of individual nations. 40 This document provides states with an
excellent place to start protecting those elements of their cultural
heritage that currently rest in the public domain wilderness.14'
C. PROTECTION FOR NON-CONFORMING WORKS-FOLKLORE
Despite the broad protection that these international measures
could potentially afford, public domain laws are limited in scope to
works whose copyright protection has expired or works that would
responses to initial working group's conclusions); Experts on Public Domain, supra note 134
(documenting committee's findings in light of the information obtained from latter reports
and state responses); Study: the Public Domain, supra note 47 (exposing then current
national measures for comparison and example); Working Group, supra note 48 (illuminating
group's initial findings and choice of moral rights as best to serve their goals).
"'o U.N. Doc. 25 C/32, supra note 138, at Annex I.
14 The most persuasive and comprehensive advocation of public domain legislation are
the reports submitted by the different interest group scholars. See Committee of Governmen-
tal Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain: Authors and the Protection
of Works in the Public Domain, U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/6 (1982) (available upon
request from UNESCO); Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works
in the Public Domain: Broadcasters and Advertisers and the Protection of Works in the Public
Domain, U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/8 (1982) (available upon request from UNESCO);
Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain:
Consumers and the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain, U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/
CEG/I/9 (1982) (available upon request from UNESCO); Committee of Governmental Experts
on the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain: Publishers, Producers of Phonograms
and Videograms and the Safeguarding of Works in the Public Domain, U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/
DP/CEG/I/7 (1982) (available upon request from UNESCO). To fully understand the
spectrum of public domain protection, these materials should be consulted.
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have been protected under copyright law had such a system existed
at the time of the works' creation or had such a system protected
their particular subject matter. These draft measures specifically
exclude protection for non-copyrightable segments of a nation's
cultural heritage such as folklore. 142 Thus, implementing global
protection for those forms of intangible cultural property that
otherwise would never be entitled to copyright protection should be
pursued as the third step towards universal protection.
Intangible cultural property that operates outside the norms of
intellectual property protection should not be overlooked because
of its nonconforming status. These works comprise a valuable part
of a nation's cultural heritage and merit accurate recreation and
preservation. International agreements have been developed that
recognize this gap. For example, the Berne Convention has altered
its authorship provisions to include anonymous folklore protection,
but the scheme is flawed. Revision of the Berne Convention to
accept national folklore as protected subject matter (along the lines
of the Tunis Model Law) could provide the desired protection, but
most commentators reject the use of copyright as inadequate to
fully protect folklore.'
UNESCO's efforts, in contrast, have produced results that both
facilitate folklore usage and preserve this artform from destruction.
As early as 1977, UNESCO began to investigate the then current
systems of protecting intellectual property and absorbed all the best
features of those systems to create a new framework for folklore
protection. 44 In an attempt to incorporate preservation, conser-
vation, utilization, and identification measures into one document,
UNESCO's experts generated the 1981 Model Provisions for
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore and
14 See Experts on Public Domain, supra note 134, at 30 (denying folklore's inclusion in
the otherwise broad meaning of public domain).
14 See Bell, supra note 109, at 4; Jabbour, supra note 85, at 13; Masouy6, supra note 83,
at 8; Niedzielska, supra note 80, at 344-46; Puri, supra note 82, at 23-24. But see Gavrilov,
supra note 80, at 77-78.
144 The initial committee of 1977 analogized protection of folklore to that of computer
programs. Any attempt to incorporate computer programs into either the copyright system
or the industrial property system had resulted in a distortion of protection for computer
programs; folklore exhibited the same unadaptability. Legal Protection of Folklore, supra
note 87, at 34.
19941 325
33
Berryman: Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
Commentary,"4 which was further qualified in 1982 by attaching
a protocol, Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial
Actions. 4  This model law concerns only commercial use of
folklore and features exclusions for uses like education or inspira-
tion, exclusions for new works, paternity rights acknowledgement
through its origin designation requirements, an option for domaine
public payant to generate funds for administration, and the
establishment of a competent body authorized to enforce designated
sanctions.'47 These measures stimulated ample regional discus-
sion on the merits of national folklore statutes and on the need for
a complementary international instrument."4
WIPO and UNESCO responded by unveiling their Draft Treaty
for the Protection of Expression of Folklore Against Illicit Exploita-
tion and Other Prejudicial Actions, which was the work product of
numerous meetings held during the intervening years. 4 9 This
Draft Treaty recognized the need for international protection in
light of the "uncontrolled use of such expressions by means of
" Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore,
reprinted in Working Group on the Intellectual-Property Aspects of Folklore Protection,
COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 15, no. 2, at 19 Annex I (1981) [hereinafter Model Provisions]
(reporting discussion and results of working group meeting).
" Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore against
Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, reprinted in COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no.
4, at 62 Annex 1 (1982).
For commentary on these provisions, see Gavrilov, supra note 80, at 76-79 (noting author's
belief that "the establishment of legal protection for works of folklore would enable
international cultural interchange to take place in a more orderly fashion"); Jabbour, supra
note 85, at 12-14; Masouy6, supra note 83, at 10-24.
147 See Model Provisions, supra note 145, at Annex I (listing text of provisions).
148 See Committee of Experts on Means of Implementation of Model Provisions for National
Laws on Intellectual Property Aspects of the Protection of Intellectual Property Aspects of the
Protection of Expressions of Folklore and Traditional Folk Culture in the Latin American and
Caribbean Countries, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 16, no. 12, at 76 (1982) (setting forth report of
regional meetings); Regional Committee of Arab States, supra note 83, at 16 (setting forth
report of regional meeting); Regional Committee of Experts on Means of Implementation in
Africa of Model Provisions on Intellectual Property Aspects of Protection of Expressions of
Folklore, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 17, no. 2, at 47 (1983) (setting forth report of regional
meeting); Regional Committee of Experts on Means of Implementation in Asia of Model
Provisions on Intellectual PropertyAspects of Protection of Expressions of Folklore, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 17, no. 2, at 39 (1983) (setting forth report of regional meeting).
149 See Group of Experts on the International Protection of Expressions of Folklore by
Intellectual Property, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no. 2, at 22 (1985) [hereinafter Group of
Experts] (summarizing discussion of Draft Treaty).
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modern technology, beyond the limits of the country of the commu-
nity in which they originate." 5 ° Under the Draft Treaty, national
treatment is imposed on any commercial use of folklore subject to
authorization by each state authority delegated to administer and
enforce the treaty.'5 ' The Draft Treaty provides remedies for
folklore of multinational origin in that regional centers can register
such works and authorize their use. 5 2 Specific exceptions to use
authorization requirements are granted for educational and
inspirational purposes.'53 Paternity rights arise from source
acknowledgment provisions of the treaty (community or regional),
as do the offense designations containing misrepresentation or
consumer-protection elements.1 5 4  Although domestic remedies
and sanctions are mandated, national measures remain intact
because the treaty is only supplemental, if such national measures
predate the treaty's adoption.'55
The protective scope of this treaty, however, was limited to illicit
export of folklore and did not effectively protect the integrity of
folkloric works. UNESCO formed a second committee to explore
this issue. The 1985 Committee called for the preservation,
registration, conservation (archival), dissemination, and controlled
usage of folklore within a framework of international coopera-
tion. 56 The Committee's recommendations set out specific obliga-
tions for member states to implement domestically, such as
5
o Id. at 23; Preamble, Draft Treaty for the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against
Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Action, reprinted in COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no.
2, at 34 (1985) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
... Draft Treaty, art. II, supra note 150, at 35.
152 Id., art. III, at 35.
1
'
3 Id., art. VI, at 36.
1
- Id., art. VII, at 37 (enumerating source acknowledgment provisions); id., art. VIII, at
37 (listing offense provisions).1
'
5 Id. at 34.
15 Second Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding of Folklore,
COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 19, no. 2, at 39, 45 Annex 1 (1985) [hereinafter Second Committee on
Folklore]. A Special Committee of Technical and Legal Experts met during the summer of
1987 to hone their ideas, see Safeguarding of Folklore, COPYRIGHT BULL., vol. 21, no. 3, at
51 (1987) (summarizing committee's discussions), before final presentation to the General
Conference. See Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore
Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its Twenty-Fifth Session, COPYRIGHT
BULL., vol. 24, no. 1, at 8 (1990) [hereinafter Recommendation on Folklore] (recommending
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establishing national archives to preserve and catalog folklore,
adapting educational programs to pique cultural awareness, and
imposing disseminator restraints to monitor the use of folkloric
works for accuracy.5 7 Most importantly, these recommendations
provide a basis for states to expand their intangible cultural
property protection to include such non-conforming works as
folklore.
D. ADVOCACY OF EXPLICIT CONVENTION PROTECTION FOR INTANGIBLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY
The final step towards achieving adequate and universal
protection leads back to this Article's initial inquiry into the
convention measures covering tangible cultural property: should
similar convention protection be extended or developed for intangi-
ble cultural property? Intangible cultural property not only
warrants and merits such measures in its own right, but also
merits such measures because the goals of the tangible conventions
cannot otherwise be attained fully.
Intangible cultural property merits convention protection for
several reasons. First, intellectual creations comprise a significant
portion of a state's cultural patrimony and are actual reflections of
culture. 1 8 Second, intangible property facilitates societal devel-
opment because each intellectual work expresses the dimensions of
a society and each work tells the members of its creating society
who and what they are.159 Third, intangible cultural property
evokes the same response of cultural nationalism from a nation's
people as tangible property. For example, "The Star Spangled
Banner" instills the same sense of pride in Americans as the
Washington Monument, yet only the Washington Monument is
eligible for international convention protection. 160 Lastly, intangi-
167 See Recommendation on Folklore, supra note 156, at 9-11 (recommending definition
of folklore, procedures to identify folklore, and methods to conserve, preserve, disseminate,
and protect folklore).
15 See supra note 18.
1 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (quoting Merryman's exclamation on
importance of art to society in non-denigrated form).
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ble cultural property constitutes part of the "common heritage of
mankind"16' and, as such, merits protection from destruction
similar to the protection afforded tangible cultural property
segments of the "common heritage of mankind" under the Hague
and Paris Conventions and the Antarctica under the Law of the
Sea Convention. 62
Intangible cultural property also warrants convention protection
because the same circumstances confront intangible cultural
property that threatened tangible property prior to the enactment
of its convention protection." National protection cannot ade-
quately protect intangible property because of the international
nature of abuse."s Present international conventions inadequate-
ly protect existing creations from moral rights violations,' and
no relief has been provided for post-copyright works or for those
unsuitable for copyright.' Intangible cultural property faces the
same threats of destruction and inaccurate preservation that
haunted tangible property prior to the Hague Convention. Mass
media and piracy undermine intangible property, rather than
armed conflict.6 7 Abuses may take the form of incorporeal theft,
as opposed to an actual physical taking governed by the Paris
Convention, but the act is still theft and still destructive to a
nation's intangible cultural heritage.'8 Lastly, the "decontextual-
ization" dilemma that plagued tangible property (i.e., if a work is
taken out of context, a loss in value and information occurs) 1
69
directly threatens forms of folklore and mirrors the loss suffered if
161 See U.N. Doc. 25 C/32, supra note 138 (preamble); Draft Treaty, supra note 150
(preamble).162 See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 57-63 (exploring use of "common heritage of mankind"
language in those documents).163 See generally MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 15, at 2-53; see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 4, at 36-40 (analyzing aims of Hague Convention).
164 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing exploitation of folklore).
16 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing protection under Berne
Convention).
1" See supra note 141 and accompanying text; RICKETSON, supra note 21, at 315.
167 See supra note 85.
'6 See supra note 86.
" See John H. Merryman, Two Ways Of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J.
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works are not reproduced fully or accurately. 7 °
Multiple goals motivate the tangible property protection offered
by conventions.' Although preservation of physical works is the
obvious objective, such action serves to achieve other goals, such as
maintaining the work's integrity, facilitating distribution or access,
ensuring truth and certainty, preserving the cultural identity of a
particular people as well as the expression "embodied in the work,"
retrieving information, and preserving a cultural creation for the
benefit of the "common heritage of mankind."'7 Each of these
goals reflects the true interest in preserving the cultural embodi-
ment in objects by protecting the physical work. But these tangible
property goals are not met unless steps are taken to protect the
intangible elements of the tangible objects by acknowledging the
intangible elements as separate from the tangible. It is absurd to
protect tangible objects so strongly and yet not take any steps to
preserve that object's intangible elements that are valued above the
physical. If states neglect to take steps to preserve the intangible,
then when tangible property is lost by some external event, such as
armed conflict, theft, or natural disaster, the only remaining source
of information could be an inaccurate reproduction. Thus, all the
time, energy, financial, and personal resources expended to
preserve that physical property are wasted. Both tangible and
intangible property preservation must be vigorously pursued for
cultural property protection to be complete.
How can separate protection be achieved internationally? This
170 See supra note 86; Text, U.N. Doc. 25 C/32, supra note 138.
171 See generally the Hague and Paris Convention texts reprinted in UNESCO, MOVABLE
PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 336-56.
17. Experts have also recognized these inherent rationales for protecting valuable cultural
artifacts. See ISAR, supra note 85, at 21 (noting belief that tangible cultural objects warrant
protection as "visual reminder[s] of cultural heritage" and as promoters of identity and
concluding that "[a] people's awareness of cultural identity can be a force that supports
economic development"); MCBRYDE, supra note 10, at 2-4 (stating that cultural identity
derives from preservation of objects and sites and that tangible property laws preserve such
ownership for "the common heritage of mankind"); Merryman, Public Interest, supra note 9,
at 345-49 (designating identity, expression, truth, morality, and authenticity as sources of
the public interest in protecting cultural objects); John H. Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, Hot
Art: A Reexamination of the Illegal International Trade in Cultural Objects, 12 J. ARTS,
MGMT. & L. 5, 8-11 (1982) (denoting state motivations for monitoring exploitation of works




Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol1/iss2/4
1994] INTANGIBLE CULTURAL PROPERTY 331
can be done indirectly by taking steps in the private law arena to
recognize moral rights, the public domain, and folklore. Adoption
of these measures nationally raises the level of protection intellec-
tual creations can demand in individual nations. If this increase
in domestic protection is accompanied by convention amendments
that explicitly cure weaknesses like the lack of effective protection
for public domain or folkloric works, coherent protection will be
secured for intangible cultural works.
A more effective means to ensure preservation is the establish-
ment of a public international convention that explicitly offers
tangible-property-type protection for intangible cultural property.
Amending tangible cultural property conventions could achieve this
goal but these convention provisions and remedies are not designed
to protect incorporeal property.17 3  Thus, adequate protection
would mandate the creation of specific provisions that recognize the
incorporeal status of intangible cultural property and address
remedies for transgressions from an incorporeal perspective. Such
provisions and remedies could include affirmation of origin
(paternity), proper labeling if reproduction is segmented, and
injunctive relief for dissemination of inaccurate works. 74
The creation of a convention that pertains solely to the preserva-
tion and protection of intangible cultural property, a convention
enforced apart from the existing tangible conventions, would be the
optimal way to ensure distinct recognition of intangible expressions.
173 See, e.g., Hague Convention, art. 3, supra note 4, at 340 (concerning protection of
"property situated within [a state's] territory") (emphasis added). Article 4 mandates
restraint from use of property for protection from armed conflict while Articles 12 through
14 concern transportation of cultural property to safety zones. See UNESCO, MOVABLE
PROPERTY, supra note 2, at 336-56.
The Paris Convention's language is better suited for including intangibles, but its
provisions are still tailored to physical property. For example, Article 2 mandates refraining
from illicit practices that impoverish the physical cultural heritage of a particular nation.
Article 5 authorizes creation of domestic measures (preservation, cataloging, archeological
guidelines, etc.) to maintain the physical cultural heritage, while Article 7 implements
museum controls to stem market demands. Article 9 mandates monitoring physical property
import/export while Article 13 provides restitutional remedies for illicit exportation by
providing that nations can declare certain cultural property pieces to be inalienable from that
state. Id. at 357-64.
174 For example, tangible property provisions call for the return of illegally exported
property; an intangible provision could require respect for intangible property that is
transmitted beyond its native borders and proper attribution to the country or region where
the work originated.
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The convention document could usurp many of the tangible cultural
property preambles, goals, and rationales with only a redirection of
terms and language to fit its incorporeal object. Its provisions also
could be adapted from domestic laws, such as moral rights laws,
public domain laws, or folklore laws, and from proposed interna-
tional instruments. One must note that commentators and
UNESCO have suggested that the international public domain and
folklore recommendations are mirror images of tangible cultural
property conventions for certain segments of intangible cultural
property."'v One also must note the highly positive response
UNESCO received from its member nations which reiterated the
need for intangible cultural property protection and stated their
satisfaction with UNESCO's draft rules as effective remedies for
the abuses faced by public domain works and folklore. This
positive member-state response would seem to indicate that
adoption of international protection is both politically feasible and
ripe.1
76
An effective convention document would need teeth comparable
to those in the tangible cultural property conventions. The
convention document should include: (i) strongly stated protective
(mandatory) duties for a nation's own intangible cultural property
as well as that of other states; 77 (ii) ethical guidelines for indus-
try practice;1 78 (iii) acknowledgement of state moral responsibili-
ties to protect intangible cultural property as linked to the common
175 See Experts on Folklore, supra note 81, at 34; Second Committee on Folklore, supra
note 156, at 41-42; U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/7, supra note 141, at 14; U.N. Doc. 25 C/32,
supra note 138, at Annex II n.28.
176 See U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/4, supra note 71 (recording states' response to
proposed public domain protection); Committee of Governmental Experts on the Safeguarding
of Works in the Public Domain: Comments Received from International Organizations
Concerning the Report of the Working Group on Works in the Public Domain, U.N. Doc.
PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/5 (1982) and U.N. Doc. PRS/CPY/DP/CEG/I/5 Add.1 (1983) (available
upon request from UNESCO) (response of international associations to public domain
protection); Draft Recommendation to Member States on the Safeguarding of Works in the
Public Domain: Final Report, U.N. Doc. CC/MD/9 (1989) and U.N. Doc. CC/MD/9 Add.1
(1989); U.N. Doc. CC/MD/9 Add.2 (1989) (available upon request from UNESCO) (states'
advocating draft legislation on safeguarding public domain works).
177 Cf. supra note 7 (discussing Hague and Paris Convention obligations to protect
cultural property extraterritorially).
178 Cf. Paris Convention, art. 7, supra note 5.
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heritage of mankind;179 (iv) specific enforcement designation;'8s
(v) specific means to protect intangible property that states must
domestically implement or legislate;' and (vi) the assurance of
safeguards and respect for intangible cultural property, by imple-
menting, for example, a minimum of paternity and integrity
rights."2 The document should balance free use and dissemina-
tion with protection and preservation interests, but the retentive
nationalism inherent in tangible property conventions should be
tempered in favor of cultural internationalism for the common
heritage of mankind to ultimately benefit."8
Only when intangible cultural property has attained similar
convention or international protection from abuse as tangible
cultural property will uniform and universal cultural property
protection be achieved-a worthy goal to aspire to meet for the sake
of preserving the cultural patrimony of mankind.
179 Cf. Hague Convention, Preamble, supra note 4.
'
82 Cf. Hague Convention, Regulations for the Execution of the Hague Convention, supra
note 4.
181 Cf. Hague Convention, ch. VII, supra note 4.
182 Cf. supra note 7 (noting Hague and Paris Convention requirements of respect and
protection from destruction).
1 Merryman has outlined the three basic tenets of cultural internationalism as
preservation, integrity, and distribution/access. Unlike the perspective of cultural
internationalism, cultural nationalism focuses on the identity of cultural property as
belonging to a particular nation and on restitution of property to its originating nation.
Merryman espouses that cultural nationalism is not the logical way to achieve protective
goals, especially in light of the 'common heritage of mankind" premise. See John H.
Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1910-21 (1985); see
also Merryman, Cultural Property, supra note 169, at 842-53 (1986) (critiquing application
of cultural nationalism principles in both Hague and Paris Conventions and concluding that
cultural internationalism is preferential model for convention protection of cultural property).
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